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Capitalism: Neoliberal, Organizational,
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Neoliberals argue that rapid liberalization and privatization can
transform postcommunist economies into Western-style capitalist
systems. Organizational sociologists argue that these policies pro-
duce a unique variety of capitalism, while world-systems theorists
argue that they lead to underdevelopment. This article advances a
social structural alternative in a crucial case. Poland’s relative eco-
nomic success resulted from prolonged state ownership and an in-
terventionist state employing various industrial policy tools that fa-
cilitated efficiency-enhancing market-oriented restructuring before
ushering in beneficial foreign direct investment. The resulting cap-
italist system closely resembles the typical pattern found in most
late industrializers.
Almost 15 years ago, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites
were subject to a revolutionary transformation for the second time in a
century, altering the lives of hundreds of millions of people, along with
the global economic and geopolitical landscape. Intellectual advice for
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this transformation was provided by economists working from the neo-
liberal neoclassical, or the “orthodox economic,” research tradition—pro-
ponents of what came to be known as the “Washington consensus.” This
advice was seized on by postcommunist elites, who had themselves, quite
reasonably, developed an aversion to the overbearing role of the state in
the economy during communism.2
As a result, the first postcommunist elites were usually able to imple-
ment some version of the Washington consensus without serious oppo-
sition (UNDP 1999, p. 30; Murrell 1996, p. 31; Greskovits 1998, pp. 22–
23). That said, social scientists working in the broad neoclassical socio-
logical research tradition were quick to challenge the neoliberal-inspired
transition policies and the comparative economics on which they were
based. This should not be surprising: sociology was born in an attempt
to understand the transition to capitalism in Europe, and the core as-
sumptions of economic sociology are the exact opposite of neoclassical
neoliberal ones.3
The sociological critiques of neoliberalism can be divided into three
competing metatheoretic camps within the larger neoclassical sociological
tradition (see the debate in AJS in 2001): (1) World-system theorists insist
on placing causal primacy for a country’s development path on forces
emanating from the world system. For them the transition ushers in not
convergence with the advanced capitalist core but underdevelopment. (2)
The varieties of capitalism approach places primacy on the country’s
internal social and organizational structure. The organizational perspec-
tive stresses microstructures or networks at the firm level. (3) The social
structural approach stresses macrolevel structures, like state structures,
and the pattern of conflict and collaboration within the power elite (or
segments of the dominant class) over state structures.
We examine the strengths and weaknesses of these perspectives by
2 See the seminal work of anthropologist Janine Wedel (2001) on these networks, and
Kennedy’s (2002) and Eyal’s (2000) cultural analyses.
3 Neoclassical economics builds on the work of Smith and Ricardo, while neoclassical
sociology builds on the work of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim (see Smelser and Swedberg
1994). The different assumptions of the two research traditions are the importance of
social relationships versus methodological individualism, cognitive limitations on in-
formation versus free and widely distributed information, the reliance on habits when
possible and the importance of norms versus strictly rational utility-maximizing be-
havior, and a society stratified by power versus free and voluntary actions (see the
more detailed discussion in Smelser and Swedberg [1994, esp. p. 4, table 1]). One could
also add the historical nature of neoclassical sociology compared to the claims for social
laws generalizable across all time and space for the neoliberals. Both Marx and Weber
emphasized the historical nature of society (and the potentially contingent historical
evolution of the mode of production and mode of administration, respectively)—
whereas the core of neoclassical economics is ahistoric equilibria.
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analyzing the transition to capitalism in the most successful postcom-
munist economy, Poland.4 The relatively successful outcome in Poland
was the result of an interventionist and developmental state which facil-
itated state-owned enterprise (SOE) restructuring prior to privatization
through competitive auction, prominently to multinational corporations.
These foreign owners provide technology, capital, and markets, further
facilitating successful enterprise restructuring. The neoliberals were wrong
that “the market” was the path to advanced capitalism, because they
neglected the necessity of an interventionist state, acting well beyond their
ideal “night-watchman” model, in managing a successful integration into
the global economy ( see Frye and Shleifer 1997). World-systems theory
is unable to explain why Poland (and the rest of Central East Europe)
did not succumb to the pattern of underdevelopment found in the former
Soviet Union. The organizational account does not anticipate the new
ownership structure of the postcommunist economy, which comes to be
dominated by the same types of property configurations found in other
developing capitalist countries. The social structural contribution is to
affirm the need for a developmental state in the postcommunist context
and to highlight the importance of foreign direct investment for successful
development.
There are seven sections to this article. The first reviews the competing
theories of postcommunist transition and generates testable hypotheses at
the level of mechanisms. The second discusses methodology, arguing from
a neo-Lakatosian position in favor of prioritizing crucial case studies that
use both qualitative and quantitative data. The third details the Polish
state’s economic policies. The fourth provides a qualitative asssesment of
property change and restructuring based on case studies of firms. The
fifth provides a quantitative assessment of the structure of property and
evaluates the theories at the level of mechanisms using randomly sampled
firm-level data. The sixth synthesizes these data, producing a theoretical
description of the features of Polish capitalism. In the conclusion, we
specify the theoretical implications of this analysis for the comparative
study of postcommunist capitalist systems and development more
generally.
THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF POSTCOMMUNIST TRANSITION
The varying social scientific approaches seek to explain how the transition
took place, offering different explanations for postcommunist variation
4 Poland has the highest rate of growth (59.9%) of all the transition countries (see table
1 later in this discussion).
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in performance, and different ultimate end points (i.e., the institutional
features of the postcommunist economy).
Neoliberal Neoclassical Transition Economics
Neoliberal economists designed the radically antistatist shock therapy
policy package that served as a blueprint for economic change in the
postcommunist world. Shock therapy policies—rapid and extensive sta-
bilization, liberalization, and privatization—were crafted to allow effi-
ciency considerations to shape the organizations of the new capitalist
economies. Stabilization meant limiting government spending and cur-
rency emissions (thereby creating a stable value of money). Liberalization
meant allowing free trade and free prices. Privatization meant transferring
SOEs into private hands.
Once these changes were accomplished, a new efficient set of organi-
zations would replace the deformed and inefficient SOEs that were in-
herited from socialism (see Sachs 1991, p. 3; 1996; Frydman, Gray, and
Rapaczynski 1996; Kosolowski 1992; Lipton and Sachs 1990a; Fischer
and Gelb 1991; Blanchard et al. 1993, pp. 10–11; Carlin, Reenen, and
Wolfe 1994, p. 72; for an excellent review, see Spenner et al. [1998]. The
mechanisms at work come straight from Smith and Ricardo: “Private
ownership would ensure profit-oriented corporate governance, while lib-
eralization of trade and prices would set free the competitive market forces
that reward profitable activities. Firms would have therefore both internal
and external incentives to restructure” (EBRD 1999, p. 298). After a rel-
atively brief period of economic contraction (usually claimed to be six
months in public pronouncements [Wedel 2001]), during which resources
would reallocate according to each country’s comparative advantage, po-
stcommunist economies would enter a growth trajectory that would close
the developmental gap with Western Europe, and its citizens would ex-
perience a “democratically based rise in living standards” (Sachs 1994, p.
25).
For both economic and political reasons, neoliberals insisted that SOEs
should be privatized as quickly as possible. Political factors are expected
to impinge on the operation of SOEs, leading to suboptimal use of re-
sources (e.g., firms may put off unpopular restructuring). Public ownership
increases the chances that the state will continue to bail out inefficent
firms—thereby failing to harden budget constraints. These subsidies con-
tribute to inflation, undermining stabilization. State ownership also creates
opportunities for corruption by state officials. Similarly, state bureaucrats
do not have the necessary incentive structure to properly monitor the
managers of SOEs, providing opportunities for corruption by enterprise
insiders.
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All of these economic arguments favor the privatization of as many
SOEs as possible, as quickly as possible. However, neoliberals believe
rapid privatization is even more urgent for political reasons. Unless ac-
complished quickly, neoliberals warned, “the political battle over priva-
tization will . . . lead to a stalemate in the entire process, with the dev-
astating long-term result that little privatization takes place at all” (Lipton
and Sachs 1990a, p. 298). Managers and workers in inefficient SOEs will
have an interest in derailing privatization and maintaining state subsidies
and protection. Thus one of the aims of rapid privatization is “to decrease
the political power of the state sector” (Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Tur-
kowitz 1997, p. 84). Owing to this time constraint, privatization “must
take place before firms have been restructured” (Blanchard et al. 1993,
p. xiv).
For the most prominent neoliberals privatization could not proceed as
it has in the West, where firms are sold one at a time to the best potential
owner. There were simply far too many SOEs, and not enough potential
owners. Lipton and Sachs warned: “If the [Polish] government becomes
enmeshed in case-by-case bargaining, there will be no end in sight” (Lipton
and Sachs 1990a, p. 298). So, neoliberals reasoned, a significant amount
of the shares of SOEs must be given away. In addition to transferring
some shares to firm insiders to buy their support for privatization, this
would involve some type of “mass privatization” program, in which cit-
izens would receive (or buy for a nominal fee) vouchers that could be
exchanged for shares of privatized enterprises. In addition to its speed,
this solution would “gain popular support” for the transition to a private
economy (Liberman, Nestor, and Desai 1997, p. 1).
Although neoliberals recognized that various market institutions would
also have to be created, they understood that accomplishing the following
fundamental tasks took precedence: forging a stable monetary environ-
ment, establishing a system of private property, and replacing state with
market integration. The institutions facilitating firm restructuring were
among those postponed. As a result, the shock therapy policy package
contained a huge lacuna: How were firms expected to find the resources
for desperately needed restructuring?
Clearly, mass privatization would create owners devoid of the necessary
financial resources. And since one of the main tasks of transition was to
drastically curtail state subsidies and to leave “allocative decisions to the
private sector” (Frye and Shleifer 1997, p. 354), the state was not supposed
to provide any substantial amount of investment capital. Capital for firm
restructuring would have to develop as a result of “the power of natural
market forces.” Liberalization (given macroeconomic stability) would lead
to competition, which would in turn lead to “the rapid emergence of
markets for goods, labor and capital, thereby creating an appropriate
American Journal of Sociology
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environment for the massive reallocation necessary for a fundamental
transformation of the economy” (Lipton and Sachs 1990b, pp. 102, 111).
Waiting for foreign investment, another possible source of this capital,
was seen as impractical because it clashed with the need for rapid pri-
vatization. At the beginning of the transition “countries were perceived
as too risky for foreign investment,” and it was assumed that nationalism
would make large amounts of privatization through foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) unpopular (Liberman et al. 1997, p. 8; Blanchard et al.
1993, p. 81).
We wish to highlight that the neoliberal policy package is incompatible
with sector-specific industrial policies. Such policies violate the prescrip-
tion of low and uniform tariffs and the elimination of other types of
protection (e.g., quotas), as well as the need to radically curtail firm sub-
sidies. They also fail to “get prices right” (Krueger 1974, 1990; Bhagwati
1986). Throughout the postcommunist world, neoliberal ministers of in-
dustry and trade made the same quip: “The best industrial policy is no
industrial policy” (Bochniarz 2001). It was firmly believed that “imperfect
markets” were vastly superior to “imperfect states” (Wade 1993).
Neoliberals believe that the most successful postcommunist countries
are those that most closely hewed to the neoliberal policy package. The
economies of these countries would quickly resemble the market capi-
talism of the “advanced West”—capitalist ownership integrated by free
markets (see EBRD 1996, 1999, 2001; de Melo and Gelb 1996; de Melo
et al. 2001; Sachs 1996; Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh 1996).
The World-System Theory of Postcommunist Involution
If the neoliberals can be seen as capitalism’s optimists, world-systems
theorists are its pessimists. They describe the transition from socialism as
a process of forced globalization that benefits rich countries at the expense
of the masses of the postcommunist world (Gowan 1999; Andor and Sum-
mers 1998; Chossudovsky 1997; Stiglitz 2002; Staniszkis 2001; Burawoy
2001a; Kagarlitsky 1999). While most social scientists from this perspec-
tive acknowledge that local social and productive relationships are im-
portant, they nonetheless identify global capitalism as the most crucial
causal force. We focus on the work of Michael Burawoy, who pays great
attention to local productive relations, but ultimately falls back on the
force of the global capitalist system as the ultimate determinant of
postcommunist developmental outcomes.
Burawoy has been studying the transition from communism through
rounds of ethnographic fieldwork in Hungary and then Russia over the
last decade and a half. First, Burawoy formulated the theory of merchant
capitalism (Burawoy and Krotov 1992), which was reformulated as a
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world-systems-compatible theory of postcommunist “involution” (Bura-
woy 1996, 2001a). According to the theory of merchant capitalism, the
transition from communist party rule meant the withering away of the
state as a consequence of an attempt to implement neoliberal transition
policies (Burawoy and Krotov 1992, p. 19). Instead of producing economic
development, this produced underdevelopment, as the pathologies of the
old economic system were only reinforced. The informal relationships that
emerged between enterprises trying to solve for problems in the shortage
economy are re-created, leading to the dominance of barter over market
integration. Old socialist conglomerates strengthen themselves and rein-
force their monopoly positions. Finally, worker control of the labor process
is increased, and the workers become merged with the means of produc-
tion. As a result, there is no systematic pressure on firms inducing them
to constantly reinvest in the means of production or to change products
to maximize profits. Surplus is appropriated in the sphere of circulation
by “merchant capital,” a politically connected trade and financial elite,
producing demodernization.
Burawoy (1996, 1999, 2001a, 2001b) expanded his merchant capitalism
thesis into the theory of postcommunist involution. Ultimately, the with-
ering away of the state and the reproduction of soft-budget constraints
(and not the monopoly power of conglomerates, or the merger of the
workers with the means of production), is identified as the crucial causal
ingredient in Russia’s economic performance: “At each step of the tran-
sition the absence of an effective state explains the unintended conse-
quences of reform as the acceleration of economic involution” (Burawoy
1996, p. 1111). Even though involution was driven by state collapse,
Burawoy insists this is not a transitional system, but rather an “emergent
and enduring type [with] nothing inherently unstable about [it]” (Burawoy
1996, p. 1115).
Ironically, it is the state itself which locks in permanent involution by
continuing to bail out inefficient firms, thereby maintaining soft-budget
constraints. As a result firms do not go out of business, and resources are
not reallocated to more efficient uses. “Russia . . . ended up with a per-
verse combination of private property and soft budget constraints. The
result is involution” (Burawoy 1996, p. 1112).
Burawoy explicitly frames his theory of postcommunist involution in
a world-systems approach. He argues that “the system logic [of capitalism]
effectively wipes out origins. Even though capitalism may diverge from
sector to sector, from country to country, from region to region, these
divergences are interconnected—the result of common underlying eco-
nomic processes” (Burawoy 2001b, p. 1109). Unlike early formulations of
world-systems theory, Burawoy recognizes the importance of local social
structure. To the extent that differences in different postcommunist sys-
American Journal of Sociology
758
tems exist, this is attributed to an (unspecified) combination of the world
system and local social structures under socialism (see Burawoy 2001b,
p. 1111).
However, there is a stronger world-systems logic at work than appears,
because these very social structures are also shaped by the world system.
The dominant domestic class comes to consist of a “merchant-financial
bourgeoisie dependent on its close ties to the state and an appendage of
international capital” (Burawoy 2001a, p. 280). Indeed, Burawoy comes
close to early, strong formulations of the determinative power of the world
system: “England in the nineteenth century and Russia at the end of the
twentieth occupy opposite positions in the global economy of their time.
For the former, foreign explorations offered new markets and cheap re-
sources that drove domestic accumulation, while for the latter, foreign
connections propel domestic disaccumulation, draining its human and
natural resources” (Burawoy 2001a, p. 280; emphasis added).
The world-systems theory of postcommunist involution would predict
that the most successful postcommunist countries limited their exposure
to the world system. However, since the whole point of postcommunist
transition was incorporation into the world system, almost all of the po-
stcommunist world should have experienced “involution” or demoderni-
zation. As a result of the insertion into the world capitalist system, en-
terprises should have retreated to barter arrangements, the state should
have continued to subsidize failing companies, investment into the pro-
ductive sphere should have ceased, and surplus should have been funneled
out of the country.
The Organizational Theory of Recombinant Property
Many scholars studying the transition to capitalism emphasize the im-
portance of organizational and institutional legacies for understanding
postcommunist society. They argue that at the firm level, local managers
rely on preexisting routines in dealing with the new environment. They
criticize the neoliberal vision of building capitalism on a tabula rasa and
claim that the new system is being built not on the ruins of communism
but with the ruins of communism (Stark 1992, 1996). As a result, orga-
nizational forms and institutional configurations created under state so-
cialism are re-created under postcommunism (Nielson, Jessop, and Haus-
ner 1995; Campbell and Pedersen 1996; Smith and Pickles 1998). The
most influential work coming from this camp is David Stark’s theory of
recombinant property (Stark 1996; Stark and Bruszt 1998, 2001).
The thrust of Stark’s critique of neoliberal transition theory is that it
has a simplistic understanding of comparative economic systems, which
ignores the importance of institutional legacies and accompanying social
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networks. There is no “transition” from “plan” to “market” but a “trans-
formation” to an unknown end point. Using Hungary as his primary
example, Stark argues that neoliberal policies did not create “private prop-
erty” and “market integration” as found in the West. Rather, a new own-
ership form, “recombinant property,” emerges, characterized by blurred
firm boundaries resulting from networks of cross-ownership and the in-
tertwining of private and state ownership (Stark 1996, p. 1007). As a
consequence, firms engage in a great deal of cooperation and collaboration,
and survive not only by performing on the market but by receiving bail-
outs and subsidies from the state. Thus, Stark describes “the emergence
of a distinctively East European Capitalism that will differ as much from
West European capitalisms as do contemporary East Asian variants”
(Stark 1996, p. 1016).
Stark’s theory is meant to describe the postcommunist political economy
via path-dependent processes. It therefore does not attempt to make gen-
eralizable predictions about what enhances collaborative behavior, which
may or may not facilitate firm restructuring (Stark 1996, pp. 112–15).
A Structural Theory of Postcommunist Divergence
We present a theory that builds on Konra´d and Szele´nyi’s (1979) analysis
of the social structure of late communism, combining it with Jadwiga
Staniszkis’s (1991) early work on postcommunism. This is a social struc-
tural theory that identifies domestic social structure/elite configuration as
a crucial factor in shaping the transformation of the postcommunist econ-
omy, primarily through its influence on state policies and its cooperation
with foreign capital.
Staniszkis (1991) argued that within the power elite in late communist
society there was a battle between the old apparatus and the “New
Center”—itself divided between “globalists” (who wanted to integrate into
the world capitalist system and introduce multiparty democracy) and
populists (who wanted to reform the party and embrace self-management).
The New Center, led in Russia by Gorbachev, was victorious over the
old apparatus—but collapsed after the system change.
In the new postcommunist environment, politics is “mostly symbolic”
since civil society needs privatization to come into existence. To this end,
a revolution from above was attempted, conducted in the “theoretical
interests” of a capitalist class that did not yet exist. Staniszkis agued that
the victory of the globalizers would lead to the emergence of “dependent
development” in the postcommunist world, as the “ontological opening”
would allow some technology transfer from the West.
We build on Staniszkis’s core insights about the role of the state (the
“revolution from above”) in making capitalism, and the emergence of a
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system of “dependent development” in which Western technology transfer
becomes possible. We combine this emphasis on state policy and foreign
technology transfer with Konra´d and Szele´nyi’s (1979) theory of socialist
social structure.
For Konra´d and Szele´nyi, communism had a power elite that consisted
of three segments—the dominant bureaucratic elite (the nomenklatura),
the technocracy, and the humanistic intelligentsia (dissidents). The pattern
of conflict and collaboration among these three segments during and after
the collapse of communism (sometimes affected by a mobilized working
class) determines the path of transition and the resulting variety of cap-
italism (King and Szele´nyi 2005; King 2002). Excluding the still Com-
munist Party–dominated East Asian systems, within the postcommunist
world proper there are two basic paths, which lead to two different va-
rieties of capitalism.
“Capitalism from above” represents the path led by an alliance of a
section of the old nomenklatura with the upper reaches of the technocracy,
particularly enterprise managers. Former members of the nomenklatura
were able to use their relationships and positional power to transform
themselves (often through their clients) into major property holders. In
this path, the role of the grand bourgeoisie was filled from the top of the
old social system, creating a grand bourgeoisie “from above”—consisting
of “clientelistic capitalists” or (“oligarchs”) and their political patrons.
When the nomenklatura was defeated by an alliance of the technocracy
and intelligentsia (possibly also in alliance with the working class, as in
Poland), these forces were able to prevent many members of the no-
menklatura from using their connections to become major owners. In-
stead, the majority of the commanding heights of the economy were sold
to MNCs and other foreign investors, creating a grand bourgeoisie “from
without”—from outside the old stratification order.
In both paths, “capitalism from above” and “capitalism from without,”
radical market reforms were attempted. In systems created “from above,”
the state was permeated by patron-client links between “clientelistic cap-
italists” and their patrons. This reduced the state’s bureaucratic capacity,
preventing the relative separation of politics and economics that is the
hallmark of what Weber called modern rational capitalism. Without a
decently strong developmental state to help forge internationally com-
petitive industries, many firms were pushed into labor-intensive low value-
added niches, and were forced to rely on highly inefficient nonmarket
integrating mechanisms in order to survive.5 Only firms whose owners
5 These are barter, debt swaps, payment in kind, granting access to the means of
subsistence rather than paying wages, and reliance on political connections for prof-
itable activity.
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have personal links to political elites were granted access to valuable raw
materials, enabling them to export and thrive. The collective result was
a state with low capacity, which, along with a very inefficient economy
dependent on exports of raw materials, created a system of “patrimonial
capitalism” in which the most important assets were personalistic con-
nections to the state.
In systems created “from without,” neoliberal policies did not cause as
much long-term developmental damage. First, because the state was not
as riddled with patron-client links, it maintained much more capacity and
was able to assist firms in restructuring through microeconomic policies
and by providing an adequate set of institutions to make modern capitalist
activity possible. The patron-client links existed as well, but were not
nearly as extensive. Second, the new foreign owners were far superior to
the “clientelistic capitalists” in terms of transferring technology, providing
investment funds, and providing global marketing networks. Conversely,
they virtually never bartered, traded in the black economy, or made late
payments.
The combination of a stronger state, and high levels of foreign invest-
ment and technology transfer from export partners, prevented the slide
of most firms into prolonged use of nonmarket integration mechanisms,
sparing the state a severe contraction of its revenues (for taxation becomes
highly problematic under these conditions). The demand provided by
foreign markets, investment resources provided by foreign owners, and
the “visible hand” of the state helped firms to successfully restructure (i.e.,
change their operations to be able to compete on the liberalized domestic
and export markets).
In this variety of postcommunist capitalism the economy will come to
be dominated by export-oriented manufacturing, and the grand bour-
geoisie will consist of foreign investors. Social property relations will be
capitalist (private ownership and free wage labor), the state will be a
liberal but developmental one, and there will be the relative separation
of the political and economic spheres.
Mechanisms and Hypotheses
We agree with Hedstro¨m and Swedberg (1996, 1998) and Elster (1989)
that by specifying the mechanisms operative in macrotheories we gain a
superior vantage point for social analysis. Following Stinchcombe we
define mechanisms as “bits of theory about entities at a different level
. . . than the main entities being theorized about” (Stinchcombe 1991, p.
367). By collecting data on the level of mechanisms we can generate
“deeper, more direct, and more fine-grained explanations” that move be-
yond the “black box” of correlational explanations (Hedstro¨m and Swed-
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berg 1996, p. 287; original emphasis). Such an analysis helps to capture
the social processes that unfold as the “cogs and wheels” (Elster 1989, p.
3) of macrocausal metatheories whirl away.
We believe that identifying mechanisms is particularly useful in com-
parative analysis. By generating competing hypotheses from these mech-
anisms we can avoid the greatest pitfall of macrocausal comparative anal-
ysis: too many variables and not enough cases. The mechanisms invoked
by the four theories are (1) the market, (2) private property, (3) state
intervention, (4) foreign ownership, and (5) foreign competition.
Neoliberal economic theory, with its emphasis on the pathologies of
state ownership, would predict that, all things being equal, private do-
mestic firms will outperform state-owned firms. The social structural the-
ory—because Poland maintained a bureaucratic state and pursued in-
dustrial policies—would not predict, all things being equal, that private
domestic firms would significantly outperform SOEs. We can thus gen-
erate two competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1.—Everything being held equal, private domestic firms
will have better performance than SOEs.
Hypothesis 2.—Everything being held equal, private domestic firms
will not have better performance than SOEs.
The same logic applies to subsidies (as examples of state intervention)
and enterprise restructuring. From the neoliberal economic perspective,
subsidies should dampen successful restructuring by softening the disci-
pline of the market, thereby taking away the need to reinvest in the means
of production. From the social structural position, the Polish state, because
it is a bureaucratic state attempting to foster capitalist modernization,
will subsidize firms even as it maintains discipline over them, at least
partially equalizing firm performance across the economy.
Hypothesis 3.—Everything being held equal, subsidized firms will
have worse performance than unsubsidized firms.
Hypothesis 4.—Everything being held equal, subsidized firms will not
have substantially worse performance than unsubsidized firms.
For the social structural position and the world-systems theory, the
most important ownership effect is not state versus domestic, but domestic
versus foreign. The neoliberal research tradition has no theoretically
grounded reason to expect that foreign capital is superior to domestic
capital; capital is capital regardless of origin. From the social structural
position, however, FDI links firms into the historically generated circuits
of capital accumulation in the advanced core. The advantages of early
capital accumulation are large, especially in capital, technology, and
know-how, and the advantages of a well-established distribution network
in the richest markets in the world.
World-systems theorists also emphasize the importance of foreign own-
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ership and cooperation. FDI, however, should lead to worse performance
as it is a parasitic link that drains the periphery of its surplus via transfer
pricing or market destruction. While some world-systems theorists would
insist that foreign-owned firms can perform well but still hurt the overall
economy, many negative effects are theorized to take place at the micro-
level (Andor and Summers 1998; Gowan 1999; Chossudovsky 1997).6 Bur-
awoy (2001b, p. 280) strongly implies this as well with his formulation
that “foreign connections propel disaccumulation.” Thus, we generate two
more competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5.—Firms with FDI will outperform domestic private
firms.
Hypothesis 6.—Firms with domestic private ownership will outper-
form firms with FDI.
The logic of foreign ownership applies equally to foreign competition.
For the world-systems theorists, penetration of the domestic market by
foreign competition leads to the defeat of domestic firms and the under-
development of the economy. Marx and Weber agreed with Smith that
market competition was a crucial mechanism by which individual capi-
talists were forced to reinvest surplus in the means of production by
specializing, innovating, and accumulating. Thus we generate two ad-
ditional hypotheses from the world-systems theory in contrast to either
the social structural or neoliberal theory:
Hypothesis 7.—Firms with higher levels of foreign competition will
restructure more than firms with lower levels of competition.
Hypothesis 8.—Firms with higher levels of foreign competition will
restructure less than firms with lower levels of competition.
These hypotheses will be evaluated in the proceeding sections—infor-
mally for the case studies, and formally with the survey data.7
CASE SELECTION IN COMPARATIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE FROM A
NEO-LAKATOSIAN PERSPECTIVE
Why study Poland? Can analyzing one case refute alternative theories?
Why is Polish economic change important to sociologists in general? An-
6 At the country level, FDI is clearly associated with both stronger economic perfor-
mance and democratic rule throughout the postcommunist world (see EBRD 1999).
But this applies only to overall levels of FDI, not FDI as a percentage of GDP (Men-
cinger 2003). While world-systems theorists can plausibly argue that in the medium
to long run, FDI will result in underdevelopment, this prediction is not falsifiable yet.
7 In a longer version of this article available from the authors, we discuss the advantages
of the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods in studying postcommunist
transition. Here it is enough to point out that this is typical of the most influential
works (e.g., Stark 1996), and that the greater validity of the case studies is comple-
mented by the greater reliability of the survey data.
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swering these questions requires us to reconstruct Lakatos’s theory of
competing research traditions for comparative social analysis.
Burawoy (1989, 1990) famously advocates a Lakatosian understanding
of progress in social science, opposing the dominant inductivist approach
as originated in Mill’s canons of induction (Skocpol and Somers 1980).
Skocpol and Somers argue that “the logic involved in the use of com-
parative history for Macro-causal analysis resembles that of statistical
analysis, which manipulates groups of cases to control sources of variation
in order to make causal inferences . . . a kind of multivariate analysis”
(Skocpol and Somers 1980, p. 182). In practice this means the use of Mill’s
method of agreement and/or disagreement (Skocpol and Somers 1980, pp.
183–84).
The most obvious problem comparativists have when they try to mimic
multivariate statistical analysis is that they quickly run out of degrees of
freedom. There are simply too many variables for the number of cases
even in those works with the greatest comparative scope. This is especially
true since there need not be any single cause of some outcome (Ragin
1987). Ragin has ingeniously confronted the “small-N problem” by in-
corporating Boolean algebra (fuzzy sets) in trying carefully to design com-
parisons to take account of the different possibilities of necessary and
sufficient conditions (Ragin 1987, 2000). We feel that even when using
fuzzy sets comparativists will usually run out of cases.
We agree with Burawoy that those who think of comparative social
science as duplicating the logic of statistical inference are leaving out
much of what comparative social scientists actually do. Burawoy, follow-
ing Lakatos, observes, “We would have no theories if we always aban-
doned them when they were refuted by facts” (Burawoy 1989, p. 760).
Rather, science progresses through the competition of groups of scholars
in “research traditions.” Rather than seeking a single confrontation of the
theories and the facts, scientists typically seek to defend against refutations
of their own theory (Lakatos 1970, see especially pp. 119, 133, 155). Thus,
science advances not in any single confrontation of “theory” with “facts,”
but with defensive attempts by scientists to save their original theories.
“The history of science has and should be the history of competing research
programs (or if you wish, ‘paradigms’)” (Lakatos 1970, p. 155).
To put it with Lakatos’s contemporary, Thomas Kuhn (1970), “normal
science” consists of trying to incorporate “anomalies” within particular
paradigms (research traditions). Over time, the accumulation of anomalies
will lead to a “scientific revolution” in which one paradigm replaces an-
other. For Lakatos, normal science consists of attempts to defend against
attempts at refutation from rival research traditions, or by rival theories
within research traditions. Research traditions can only gradually win or
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lose over other research traditions by the accumulation of two different
types of strategies of refutation by individual scholars.
One attempt at refutation leads to the “degeneration” of research
traditions: attempts to save the core metatheoretical postulates are made
by limiting the scope of the empirical phenomenon to which the theory
applies or by labeling disconfirmations as “exceptions.” Arguably, the
greatest degeneration can be seen in the emergence of unresolved para-
doxes within the research tradition. The other strategy to defend against
refutation is to incorporate the facts by building a new theoretical plank
“consistent with the hardcore” theoretical postulates, a new “belt of theory”
to defend the core (Burawoy 1989; see Lakatos 1970, p. 187).
To distinguish our approach from the more relativistic interpretations
of Lakatos (or Kuhn) it can be consiered neo-Lakatosian. In this inter-
pretation, theories can never be disproved—the total rejection of a re-
search tradition (or paradigm) can never be secured by the facts. Rather,
other processes or forces determine when a “paradigm shift” or the death
of a research tradition occurs. Thus, there is no real scientific progress,
and science does not provide a superior way of knowing things than other
systems of thought, like folkways or magic (Feyerabend 1975). Lakatos
and Kuhn (at least in the second edition of Scientific Revolution) did not
adhere to this position. For them, as cases pile up that can or cannot be
positively explained by research traditions, science is progressing. As maps
improve without ever perfectly corresponding to the terrain, science can
move closer to objective truth even though it can never reveal a perfect
correspondence of reality uninfluenced by metatheroetical logic. Unlike
epistemological relativists, we consider ourselves heirs to Mill’s forbearers
Hume and even Bacon; scientific induction is crucial in uncovering truth.
Of course, we eschew the overly narrow inductionism of Bacon, recog-
nizing that Hume’s induction exists in dialectical relationship with Des-
cartes’s deduction.
Also, unlike Burawoy, we hew to the orthodox Weberian position that
social scientists must strive to separate their subjective values from their
social analysis—values should be acknowledged but should not contam-
inate the facts. Such contamination can be reduced by cultivating a re-
flexive understanding of one’s own metatheoretical underpinnings and
methods, and their concomitant normative implications.8
Furthermore, we seek to evaluate research traditions and metatheories
against each other by carrying out multiple tests of their purported mech-
anisms. Social scientists should try to make competing “metatheories” or
8 We believe that in many scientific journals authors make normative judgments, only
such commentary is not singled out and is deemed “objective” when the editors and
readers are part of the same research tradition as the writer.
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“research traditions” commensurate with each other so that they can be
directly compared against one another. Thus we believe that social sci-
entists—through careful case selection and paying close attention to the
measurement of social mechanisms—can partially “telescope” scientific
progress, even though we understand that no single comparative study
will decisively disprove a metatheory. From the neo-Lakatosian perspec-
tive, individual studies point out the strengths and weaknesses of theories
located in competing research traditions, instead of providing decisive
negative proof in the Popperian sense.
In our neo-Lakatosian reconstruction, social scientists engaged in com-
parative historical research should be explicit about identifying the macro
independent and dependent variables. However, they must recognize that
the value of a case study does not lie only in the proving or disproving
of various macrocausal theories with reference to these macrovariables.
We believe that the best works of comparative social science provide
“thick” studies of crucial cases.
Such studies identify the big independent and dependent variables,
thereby locating themselves within a research tradition. However, cases
are “successful” or convincing not only because of the identification of a
correlation between independent and dependent variables in a single or
a few countries, but also from the “thick description” of the country cases.
Moore’s (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy is not a
classic only because it “controlled” for class and state structure among six
cases, but also because of the quality of the individual case studies in the
core chapters of the book. It is because of the convincing Moore does as
he lays out his interpretation of the cases that his six-country comparison
is taken as a persuasive demonstration of his theory relating class structure
to the path of modernization.
The classics of comparative social science are classics because they
combine a strong macrocausal analytic with compelling thick decriptions
of their cases—whether there are six cases, three cases (e.g., Skocpol 1979;
Brenner 1977), or one case (e.g., Neumann 1942). There can be a huge
scientific payoff with remarkably thin descriptions if the proposition is
powerful enough, and the historiography uncontested. But normally, thin
descriptions must rely on a relatively higher number of cases (such as
Therborn’s [1979] seminal account of the relationship between capitalism
and democracy in the OECD countries). For the most part, however,
classics of the comparative canon consist of thick description of a small
number of cases.
We have a two-part definition of a “thick” case. First, we mean an in-
depth understanding of a historical case (along the lines advocated by
Weber). This is the historical version of the Geertzian “thickness” of eth-
nographic accounts: providing multiple voices and piles of evidence. This
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provides a compelling narrative account of a case that is supported by a
variety of interviews and documentary sources.
Second, thick cases have multiple measures of the mechanisms that the
metatheory postulates to be operative at a lower level of analysis. When
there are numerous pieces of data that measure how mechanisms are
functioning, and the data are diverse and of high quality, the case study
is “thick.” Thus, the N we are paying attention to is not simply one or
three or six, but much higher, depending on the particular measures of
the mechanisms. In this article the N is made up by the economic history
of one country (Poland), but also 22 firm case studies, and survey data
from 246 randomly sampled firms.
In this neo-Lakatosian understanding of the comparative method, social
science is advanced the most with research on crucial cases. Certain cases
become battlegrounds for comparing research traditions and metatheories.
For example, in the field of comparative development, South Korea and
Taiwan have received much research attention from competing schools
(see the useful review in Chibber [2004]). The scientific community, within
and between research traditions, makes judgments over time based on
the accumulation of empirical studies of crucial cases. Some cases loom
larger than others. These cases are crucial because of their heightened
importance in the intersubjective world of the community of scholars.
Typically these are big countries, or countries that are either conspicous
successes or failures.
Poland has had a special place in the study of the transition, since it
was the first of the former Warsaw Pact countries to undergo a radical
attempt at transforming its economy. Poland also recovered the earliest
and has grown the most, 59.9% since the transition, with only Slovenia
and Albania even close (see table 1). This contrasts with most of the
population of the old Soviet empire, who live in countries that suffered
substantial negative growth. Poland therefore qualifies as a critical case
by our criteria.
Neoliberal economists declared Poland a country where neoliberalism
was implemented in close to ideal fashion. For the social scientists in this
research tradition, Poland’s confirmation of neoliberal theory has, we
contend, reached the status of what Merton called a “pseudo-fact”: “the
socially plausible, in which appearances persuade though they may de-
ceive” (Merton 1959, p. xiii).
In much of the neoliberal literature Poland’s relative success was at-
tributed to the policies of “shock therapy,” famously implemented by
Leszek Balcerowicz. Poland’s relative success is therefore seen as proof
that neoliberal transition policy is the very best possible. The noted in-
stitutionalist economist Peter Murrell writes: “The reforms of 1990 are
the best-known application of shock therapy. To some observers, they
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TABLE 1
GDP per Capita over Time (in Constant 1995 U.S. Dollars)
Country
GDP per Capita
% GDP
per
Capita
1990–20031990 2003
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,990 4,781 59.9
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,294 3,528 17.8
Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,934 1,133 41.4
Belarus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,098 2,248 10.8
Moldova . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,002 519 48.5
Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,753 941 46.3
Armenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 790 870 1.1
Azerbaijan . . . . . . . . . . 759* 705 7.2*
Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . 2,040 2,102 3.0
Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . 803 714 11.0
Turkmenistan . . . . . . . 1,086 1,050 3.2
Tajikistan . . . . . . . . . . . 557 292 47.7
Kyrgyz Republic . . . 745 477 36.0
Lithuania . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,418 3,208 6.1
Latvia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,279 3,611 9.2
Estonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,822 4,546 18.9
Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,857 5,943 22.3
Czech Republic . . . . . 5,269 5,861 11.2
Slovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,258 4,877 14.5
Slovenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,711* 12,763 46.5*
Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,432 5,720 10.7
Macedonia, FYR . . . 2,741 2,494 9.1
Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 1,190 41.1
Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,702 1,745 2.5
Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,716 1,827 6.4
Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . 489 457 6.1
* Dates vary slightly for these entries: for Azerbaijan, GDP is from 1992 and %GDP
from 1992–2003; for Slovenia, GDP is from 1993, and %GDP is from 1993–2003.
were very successful: admiration of the Polish reforms was apparently an
important ingredient in the calculus of the Russian reformers” (Murrell
1993, p. 112). Indeed, for many academics, journalists, and pundits, “Po-
land has always been considered to be ‘the best student in class,’ a faithful
follower of the IMF-created stabilization program and in the end one of
the few examples of success of the IMF” (Belka 2001, p. 46).
The various sociological critiques of neoliberal theory, if they wish to
challenge the neoliberal research tradition, must also somehow account
for Poland’s transition experience. If neoliberalism leads to involution,
should not Poland be at least as much blighted as Russia? If not, why
not? Poland, with a weaker military and greater debt, should have been
even more vulnerable to unfavorable incorporation into the world system.
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What new theoretical plank would have to be added to incorporate the
Polish experience into the theory of involution? Similarly, did the imple-
mentation of the neoliberal “blueprint” in Poland produce a variant of
recombinant property like Stark and Bruszt claim it did in neighboring
Hungary and the Czech Republic? If not, why not? While it is true that
Stark explicitly claims there is path dependency in determining the tran-
sition, it still would be very suprising if there was a total absence of
recombinant property in Poland. With substantially lower levels of FDI
as percentage of GDP, and much greater residual state ownership, one
would expect enterprise actors to have had at least equal opportunities
and incentives to create this type of property in Poland compared to its
neighbors.
While we compare the strengths and weaknesses of these four theories
with the different types of data, we need to keep in mind the level of
analysis from which they start. The neoliberal and the social structural
theories start at the level of the nation-state, and both believe national
factors (policy choices and social structures) to be decisive. Thus, the data
presented below will provide a more substantial clash of these theories
against each other than with the other theories. In contrast, the world-
systems theory and the organizational theory start above (at the global)
and below (at the firm) level—and thus the confrontation of the theories
is not as extensive. Scholars from these research traditions could accept
the following empirical findings, claiming that they are not trying to ex-
plain facts at the national level, at least not in Poland. This response
represents what Lakatos calls a degenerative strategy—to limit the scope
of the theory in order to protect it.
THE HISTORICAL RECORD OF STATE INTERVENTION IN POLAND
States will seek to conceal their activities that do not correspond to the
rhetoric used by dominant international actors (Wade 1990). This is un-
doubtedly true in the postcommunist environment, especially Poland,
given its population’s ideological affinity with Reaganism and anticom-
munism. This tendency was reinforced by the quick turnover of Polish
governments, making it very difficult to get comprehensive information
about all the ways in which the Polish state intervened in the economy.
The following historical evidence in no way represents a systematic ac-
count of the Polish state’s involvement in building a liberal capitalist
economy. Still, this evidence clearly calls into question the neoliberal story.
For, despite the neoliberal rhetoric, the Polish state intervened early and
often in the economy, in ways explicitly proscribed by neoliberals, in an
effort to manage the transition.
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The Neoliberal Experiment
In the first year of postcommunist Poland, the government lived up to
neoliberal expectations. On January 1, 1990, Leszek Balcerowicz, the min-
ister of finance in the first Solidarity-led government, introduced shock
therapy policies focusing on liberalization and stabilization. These were
seen as the best solution to the profound economic problems that Poland
faced at the outset of transition: hyperinflation as well as a huge foreign
debt. Macroeconomic instability was considered to be the number-one
problem, which had to be solved prior to further reforms.
The Balcerowicz plan had eight components: (1) fiscal consolidation:
moving the budget from a deficit of about 3% of GDP in the last quarter
to rough balance in 1990, mainly through a decrease in subsidies; (2)
control of inflation through a domestic credit squeeze, resulting in high
refinancing rates for banks (36% at a monthly rate in January 1990); (3)
tight income policy: an excess-wages tax was levied on SOEs that paid
wages higher than a specified level; (4) convertibility of the złoty: the
exchange rate was set and pegged low, making the average Polish in-
dustrial wage 40 cents an hour; (5) trade liberalization: tariff rates were
decreased to an average of 10% and were made more uniform, and per-
vasive quantitative restrictions and licensing requirements on trade were
largely eliminated; (6) price liberalization: the proportion of controlled
prices was decreased from 50% to 10%, and most remaining regulated
prices, especially energy prices, were sharply increased; (7) curtailing en-
terprise subsidies; and (8) privatization. Privatization was planned and
debated in 1989–90 but did not form part of the initial package of reforms,
being left for a second stage (Orenstein 2001, p. 35). However, this would
be before the firms were restructured, and would take the form of a mass
privatization program.
This program failed to solve Poland’s most pressing problem, as infla-
tion remained much higher than economists predicted, and got into the
low 30s only in 1993.9 Most significant, however, is the fact that the
economy quickly found itself in the midst of a recession, with real GDP
falling by 15% and industrial output declining by 40%. The recession was
painfully and directly felt by the population, whose standard of living fell
as its job security disappeared. In 1990, the unemployment rate rose from
a negligible amount to 6.1%, in 1991 it went up to 11.8%, and by 1993
hit 15.7% (EBRD 1996).
After only a year, the neoliberals’ feared political backlash occurred,
9 The original forecasts held that inflation would be reduced from about 18%–50% a
month during the period of August–December 1989, to about 5% in March 1990 and
about 2% a month in the second half of 1990 (Jako´bik 2000, p. 148). Inflation, which
was 585.8% in 1990, declined to 70.3% for 1991 (EBRD 2001).
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and all of the planks of the Balcerowicz program except the convertibility
of the złoty and the limitations on wage growth began to be reversed.
The neoliberal-dominated first government, led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
fell in December 1990 and was replaced by another right-of-center Soli-
darity government, led by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. While Bielecki was
closely associated with the group of “Gdan´sk liberals,” his government
took a more modified view of the transition, one that can be termed
“controlled liberalism” rather than “neoliberalism.” The defining feature
of “controlled liberalism” is the use of a non-neoliberal state to create a
liberal market society (in other words, it accepts the neoliberal end point
but significantly alters the neoliberal prescription for getting there).
The Polish state exceeded the role assigned by neoliberal theory in at
least three important ways: (1) by usurping the market mechanism by
selecting which firms would be extended credit and thereby survive the
transition, (2) by adopting various industrial policy tools to guide the
reallocation of resources,10 and (3) by acting as an active owner of the
thousands of SOEs, restructuring many of them before privatization via
competitive auctions.
Usurping the Market Mechanism by Selecting Which Firms Would
Survive
The market allocation of resources was central to the neoliberal model
of transition. Chief among the tasks to be performed by the free play of
market forces was the selection of firm survival and expansion. From
1991 to 1993, the Polish state, through the activity of the Ministry of
Industry and Trade, along with the involvement of a 100% treasury-
owned company called the Agency for Industrial Development (AID) and
nine major state-owned banks, decided which firms would be allowed to
go bankrupt from the high interest rates of Balcerowicz’s stabilization
program. This was done on a case-by-case basis, until the legal infra-
structure that allowed for a systematic evaluation of all of Poland’s major
firms was in place.11
10 We do not wish to imply that there was a single coherent industrial policy proposal
that was implemented. As the narrative will show, there were multiple industrial
policies variously implemented at different levels of government. We believe, on the
basis of our interviews and other work, that a good deal of this industrial policy
occurred on the local level in close collaboration with the enterprise managers, closely
resembling what Evans (1995) calls “embedded autonomy.”
11 The following description of events is based primarily on published accounts, along
with interviews with various governmental elites, among them two of the central elites
in these processes. One is Henryka Bochniarz, who was the minister of industry and
trade in the second Solidarity government, from January to December 1991. The other
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The first state institution to modify the neoliberal blueprint was the
Ministry of Industry and Trade. The former minister of industry and
trade in the second Solidarity government believed that her role was to
“behave like an owner of the over 8,000 large SOEs” that existed at the
beginning of the transition (Bochniarz 2001). Therefore, her first task was
to collect information on these firms. The ministry, working with the state-
owned banks, “started to make an information system to see what kind
of shape the firms/industries were in—and we tried to locate our industries
in the world market” (Bochniarz 2001). The government also began work
on a crucial piece of legislation, the Law on Financial Restructuring of
Banks and Enterprises, which would serve as the basis for a systematic
intervention in the credit process. In the two years during which this law
was drafted (it finally passed in 1993), the ministry gave help to firms “on
a company by company basis,” often in response to strikes induced by
managers colluding with workers (Bochniarz 2001).
The AID was empowered to give and underwrite loans, buy equity
stakes, coordinate restructuring programs using its own as well as external
resources, help in liquidating enterprises and managing the postliquida-
tion assets, and help to organize and hold shares in regional development
agencies (Kre˛z˙el 2001; Czerwin´ska 1995). According to its longtime general
director and president, Arkadiusz Kre˛z˙el, his organization “deals with
firms in complete economic shambles. We take them, get everything in
order to make it possible for them to be private. We assess the situation—
if the risk is acceptable we either give loans or underwrite bank guar-
antees—or we do direct investment. Then we privatize after restructuring”
(Kre˛z˙el 2001). According to Kre˛z˙el, the agency was involved in 800 such
projects as of 2001, and at the time of the interview, in July 2001, it had
160 firms in its portfolio.
The impetus behind the formation of the agency in December 1990 was
political. It sought to soften the transition by aiding firm restructuring,
and to protect state revenues. Kre˛z˙el (2001) explained, “If a firm is going
bankrupt and is the only employer in the region—and unemployment will
jump to 25% instantly—we buy a piece of the company we believe will
operate at a profit—set up a new firm—and employ a portion of old
workforce while the firm profits.” According to Kre˛z˙el, there were only
10 to 15 failures out of these 800 projects. Kre˛z˙el (2001) emphasized that
the AID, “unlike a private firm, looks not just at our own profits, but
looks at how a firm impacts the state treasury.” So they may buy an equity
stake and try to restructure a firm in order to save money that the state
would have to pay out to the unemployed. It is important to note that
is Arkadiusz Kre˛z˙el, who has been the general director and president of the AID from
1991 forward.
Liberal Capitalism
773
this organization was not advocating a statist version of capitalism but,
rather, a state that actively seeks to soften the negative effects of the
transition. Its ideology, at least as articulated by Kre˛z˙el, was thoroughly
liberal in the desired end point. For example, they take equity stakes only
“when it is difficult to find a strategic investor” (Kre˛z˙el 2001).
The AID, along with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry
of Finance, and the large state-owned banks, finally got the legal infra-
structure to deal comprehensively with deciding which of the 8,000 large
SOEs were to be deemed creditworthy, and thus allowed to restructure
their debt on very favorable conditions. The Enterprise and Bank Re-
structuring Act was passed in February 1993, shortly before the reformed
communist successor party, the Democratic Left Alliance, swept back into
power (Krajewska 2001, pp. 321–22, 328).
According to the accounts of Kre˛z˙el (2001) and Bochniarz (2001), the
ministry, the big state-owned banks, and the AID, utilizing the data bank
created by the Ministry of Industry and Trade under the Bielecki gov-
ernment considered the fate of all of Poland’s SOEs. As a result of the
severe contraction in the economy, and the huge increase in the price of
credit following the stabilization effort, virtually all large firms were in
serious financial crisis and were unable to meet their debt obligations (see
also Krajewska 2001, p. 321). These instruments of the state combined
their capacities and reviewed the creditworthiness of all major firms.
Thanks to a recapitalization of a billion U.S. dollars, the large state-owned
banks had the authority to reduce a firm’s debts for up to two years. To
qualify, each firm had to have a restructuring plan that was found ac-
ceptable by the creditors and the government. According to Kre˛z˙el, the
healthiest 70% of the SOEs were handled by the big state banks, which
extended them additional credits. The AID would take the lead in dealing
with the least healthy 30%. Two-thirds were allowed to go bankrupt, and
one-third were to be restructured and then sold to suitable strategic
investors.
Therefore the state—through the bureaucratic capacity of the Ministry
of Industry, the AID, and the large state-owned banks—stepped in for
“the market” and decided which firms would be allowed to go bankrupt
and which would be given credits for restructuring. Kre˛z˙el, recognizing
the incongruence of what the AID was doing and Balcerowicz’s declared
liberalism, described his own thinking: “I am a big liberal—but [I’m for]
practical—controlled liberalism—not the idealized version. The state has
to play a role, to give a chance to private initiative. It needs to soften
market failures—it needs to think as a super firm” (Kre˛z˙el 2001; see also
Krajewska 2001, p. 317; Czerwin´ska 1995, p. 77).
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Implementation of a Variety of Industrial Policies
For the neoliberals vertical industrial policy was seen as the sine qua non
of violating market rationality. In the first year of transition, under the
Mazowiecki government, the guiding principle, declared by Tadeusz Sy-
ryjczyk, the minister of industry and trade in the first Solidarity-led gov-
ernment, was “the best industrial policy is no industrial policy” (Bochniarz
2001). For the next two years, however, electoral backlash induced a
relaxation of adherence to these principles. First, liberalization was par-
tially reversed. This included partial reversals on monetary expansion,
the administration of prices, and tariff revenues as a percentage of imports
(see table 2). Still, anger over neoliberal policies remained, and no wonder,
with unemployment rising and other social ills, like poverty, exploding.
It was a testament to this dose of neoliberalism that in the September
1993 elections the communist successor party (the Democratic Left Alli-
ance or SLD) staged a stunning reversal, and came into power in a co-
alition with the Polish Peasant Party (or PSL, also a continuation of the
communist-era organization). With the SLD/PSL coalition government
(which would last until September 1997) came a new finance minister,
Grzegorz Kołodko, who was Balcerowicz’s Keynesian and proindustrial
policy counterpart. Declaring a new “strategy for Poland” (in June 1994),
the government actually kept in place the program (“Principles of In-
dustrial Policy”) enacted by the fourth Solidarity government, and utilized
the legislation passed by the Solidarity governments to implement the
grand debt clearing and credit extensions using the Law on Financial
Restructuring of Banks and Enterprises.12
There were many instruments of industrial policy proper. Consistent
with sector-specific industrial policy, there was an increase in protection
as measured by tariff revenues as a percentage of imports. The World
Bank provides data on the share of lines with specific tariffs and the
standard deviation of tariff rates for 1991 and 1996 in Poland. These are
the types of protection that are likely to accompany industrial policy—
specific protection of particular lines of products, and therefore a less
12 The “strategy for Poland” proposed three main goals: balanced economic growth,
macroeconomic stability, and individual welfare. The document also called for ex-
panded social dialogue. The strategy assumed economic growth of 5% or better, to be
financed by national savings and foreign direct investment. In terms of macroeconomic
policy, it was supposed to be restrictive enough to control inflation, but not enough to
limit demand. Finally, the strategy called for increased competitiveness on the part of
Polish industry (Jako´bik 2000, pp. 181–82). One should note that the previous admin-
istration, faced with social unrest, also tried to extend social dialogue. The State En-
terprise Act, signed in February of 1993, was intended to set up tripartite councils.
The pacts were never implemented, however, as the government fell by a no-confidence
vote in May of the same year.
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TABLE 2
Reform Oscillation in Poland: Monetary and Liberalization Policies
Year
Broad Money
(%changed)
% Administered
Prices in CPI
Tariff Revenues
(% of Imports) Ruling Party
1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 11.0 NA Solidarity coalitions
1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.0 11.0 12.7
1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.5 14.0 14.6
1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.0 16.0 15.0 Sept.: SLD/PSL
1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38.2 17.0 17.4
1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.9 17.0 14.0
1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.3 15.0 10.0
1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.9 12.0 5.3 Sept.: AWS/UW
1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.2 10.0 3.9
1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.3 9.0 3.1
2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.8 (est.) 9.0 2.4 June: AWS
Sources.—World Bank 1999, 2001; EBRD 2000.
Note.—AWSpAkcja Wyborcza Solidarnos´c´ (Solidarity Electoral Action); PSLpPolskie Stronnictwo
Ludowe (Polish Peasant Party); SLDpSojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance);
UWpUnia Wolnos´ci (Freedom Union). During 1990–93, there existed four coalition governments com-
posed of Solidarity factions (not counting a futile month-long effort by Waldemar Pawlak to form his
own government, in June 1992). These governments were led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki (September 1989–
December 1990), Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (January–December 1991), Jan Olszewski (December 1991–May
1992), and Hanna Suchocka (July 1992–September 1993). With the exception of Olszewski’s government,
which was a clearly conservative, right-of-center coalition, the other governments represented alliances
of ideologically disparate Solidarity factions. According to the Polish Constitution, passed in 1997 under
the SLD/PSL coalition, it is the independent Central Bank that is responsible for both setting and
implementing monetary policy. It was also during the tenure of the communist successor party coalition
that the new law on the Central Bank, implementing the constitutional principle, was passed (August
27, 1997). Earlier, after a law was passed in 1992, the Central Bank no longer had to heed the government’s
Principles of Monetary Policy.
uniform rate (a greater standard deviation of rates). In 1996, after three
years of rule by the Democratic Left Alliance, the share of lines with
specific tariffs increased from 0%, in 1992, to 5.6% (quite high by inter-
national standards), and the standard deviation went from 10.6% to 23.8%
(also quite high by international standards [World Bank 2001, p. 337]).13
The first government interventions into industry were enacted on a
case-by-case basis by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, as well as by
the AID. With the new government, there was the rise of sector-based
programs that included petrochemicals, electronics, packaging, pharma-
ceuticals, transportation equipment, machinery for agriculture and food
processing, light industry, rail, and construction materials. Government
support often took the form of targeted tax breaks for investment in new
lines of production (granted both by the treasury and by local govern-
13 For the sake of comparison, the Russian figures for 1997 were 0% (lines with specific
tariffs) and 8.5% (standard deviation of rates).
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ments), but also included government takeover and rehabilitation (most
prominently in the coal sector).14
Many of the policies and programs listed above were introduced by the
center-right government and continued by the communist successor co-
alition that came to power in September 1993. At the same time, other
sectoral programs were elaborated by the communist successor coalition
while building on the ideas sketched out by its predecessors.
A new industrial policy program was adopted in May 1995. This policy
intended to stimulate exports by constructing and supporting an insti-
tutional infrastructure that would underpin a system of export insurance
and guarantees. Based on a 1994 act, the Export Credit Insurance Cor-
poration was set up, with the intent of insuring credits taken out for
export support.15 In 1995, another act was passed, which provided for
state coverage of part of the export credit interest. Under a 1997 law, the
state treasury could give credit guarantees for the purchase of materials
and components used in production for export (Ministerstwo Gospodarki
2001; Bochniarz and Krajewski 1997; Lipowski and Macieja 1998, p.
119).
Another facet of industrial policy has been the support of technological
development. A 1994 decree of the Council of Ministers allowed invest-
ment expenses to be subtracted from taxable income, up to 50% of the
latter’s value.
The government also promoted the creation of special economic zones
and regional development agencies. The zones were intended to attract
investors, especially foreign ones, to regions in special need of restruc-
turing, above all to those suffering from high unemployment. The main
incentive was the taxation arrangement: companies in the zones obtained
tax exemption for the first half of the duration of a zone’s lifetime (usually
20 years). Thereafter, they would pay 50% of the usual tax rate.
The first zone was created in Mielec in 1995, under the supervision of
the AID. Two more zones were established in 1996, and in 1997 another
14 followed. The explanation given for such a high number of zones was
their diverse purposes: restructuring of regional industry (such as industry
servicing coal extraction, or light industry), industrial diversification of
regions, reduction of regional unemployment, and the development of
scientific research complexes (Kryn´ska 2000, pp. 37–54).
We know of only two evaluations of the effectiveness of a number of
the sectoral industrial policy programs (Bochniarz and Krajewski 1997,
14 Details about these laws and programs are available from the authors.
15 The scope of the agency’s activities was extended in 2000, when it was authorized
to insure Polish investments abroad as well as the costs of searching for foreign markets,
among other amendments.
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pp. 182–91; Lipowski and Macieja 1998, pp. 118–19). These analyses,
which evaluated the extent to which the stated goals of these programs
were realized, provided only illustrative examples and not any type of
systematic data which an independent reader could use to judge their
validity. Nonetheless, they were performed by a former minister of in-
dustry and trade (and current head of the Polish Confederation of Private
Employers) and respected Polish economists, and we can presume they
contain substantial insider information. Lipowski and Macieja claim that
the coal program had only been partially implemented, but did make
substantial progress toward the policy’s goals. The Bochniarz and Kra-
jewski assessment was more critical of the effects on the coal sector—
arguing that it primarily sustained employment. Both assessments state
that the iron and steel programs were only partially implemented, but
led to substantial restructuring and modernization. Sznajder’s (2006) in-
depth case study of the steel sector confirmed this finding. Both assess-
ments also state that the shipbuilding program was essentially
unimplemented.
The neoliberal policy package proscribed active industrial policy, es-
pecially sector-specific programs. Thus, painting Poland as a neoliberal
success story is simply inaccurate. As a last-ditch defense, neoliberals could
claim that Poland’s performance came despite the state’s weight and
intervention in the economy. But this would still leave unexplained why
such an interventionist state did not generate the developmental debacle
predicted by neoliberal theory.
The State as Real Owner of Its SOEs
According to neoliberal theory, privatization was supposed to be intro-
duced as quickly as possible. In order to speed up the privatization process
following the initial taming of inflation, plans were drawn up under the
second Solidarity government for a mass privatization scheme using
vouchers. However, the law, elaborated in mid-1991, was not passed until
early 1993; there were difficulties getting enterprise employee councils to
support it and problems with forming the necessary coalition (Orenstein
2001). So even though plans for rapid large-scale privatization had been
drawn up, they were not enacted because of political pressure by workers
and the electorate (Kramer 1995, p. 654; EBRD 1996, p. 165). The law,
moreover, was not implemented until 1995–96, and even then it was
enacted in a much reduced form, affecting only about 530 enterprises,
mostly medium-sized ones that amounted to only 10% of the productive
potential of SOEs (Bałtowski and Mickanowicz 2000).
Thus, the progress of large-scale privatization was stalled—at least in
comparison with other leaders in the region. The most prominent neoli-
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berals recognized this about Poland and judged the country harshly for
its deviation from the blueprint (Aslund 1995, p. 248; Sachs and Lipton
1992, p. 221).
Indeed, Poland has maintained a large SOE sector for years. According
to Kre˛z˙el (2001), after more than 12 years of transition, Poland still had
1,000 large SOEs. As of 2002, “the State continue[d] to own a dominant
stake in . . . steel, energy, gas petrochemicals, heavy chemicals, air trans-
port, railways, spirits, sugar and the armaments industry” (Kre˛z˙el 2001).
Polish state assets represented 32%–34% of GDP that year, compared to
the 10%–15% found in the EU (Commission of the European Commu-
nities 2002, pp. 93–94).
Most typically, SOEs increasingly restructured under competitive pres-
sures and were eventually privatized to strategic investors (either domestic
or, more likely, foreign). This had a beneficial effect on state revenues in
two ways. First, according to data compiled by the Ministry of Finance
on all enterprises with more than five employees, SOE taxes were “the
main source of budgetary income spent on the public service sector, in-
cluding investment in human capital,” at least until 1997 (Doman´ski 1997,
p. 23). And because until 1995 SOEs were subject to the popiwek, a tax
on excessive wages in the public sector, they were disproportionately
taxed, and ended up subsidizing the emergent private sector. Second,
because firms had been restructured, when they were put up for priva-
tization, there appeared, typically, several legitimate potential strategic
owners, and so the Polish state’s privatization revenue was far greater
than it would have been if the pace of privatization had been faster.
It is increasingly clear that the most dynamic part of the Polish economy
seems to be under foreign ownership, disproportionately exporting and
importing (Liberska 1997, pp. 2–4), especially with the EU. Kamin´ski and
Smarzyn´ska (2001) report that FDI initially entered Poland in advertising-
intensive sectors in the early 1990s (somewhat supporting the world-
systems expectation that this FDI was seeking domestic markets rather
than production opportunity). However, the reasons for initial entry into
Poland did not necessarily have much to do with future development. In
the second half of the 1990s, FDI entered increasingly skilled labor-in-
tensive industries, capital-intensive industries, and sectors with a large
export potential (Kamin´ski and Smarzyn´ska 2001, p. 266). Also, there was
a gradual shift from joint ventures to majority foreign ownership. Fully
foreign-owned companies accounted for 40% of FDI in 1993, 45% in 1995,
and 50% in 1998. This was likely a move to increase control as cutting-
edge technology was transferred (Smarzyn´ska 2000).
These foreign-owned firms led an export boom. They exported $3.609
billion in 1994, and $13.528 billion in 1998, while locally owned firms
exported $13.577 billion in 1994, and $14.661 billion in 1998. Of the 500
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largest firms in Poland in 1999, 144 were foreign owned (29% of the total),
and they were responsible for 46% of the exports from these firms. In
1998 they exported 62% of their production, compared to 49% for do-
mestic firms (Kamin´ski and Smarzyn´ska 2001, p. 277).
Not only was the Polish economy reoriented to exports to the EU, but
the composition of exports changed as well. Exports shifted away from
food, grains, and beverages (from 20% in 1989 to 10% in 1993), as well
as from industrial supplies and materials (from 32% to 22% and 14%,
respectively, in the same time span) in favor of capital goods, such as
vehicles and vehicle parts (from 11% in 1989 to 27% in 1998; Kamin´ski
and Smarzyn´ska 2001, pp. 273–75).
Essential for evaluating the impact of these exports is the faster rate
of growth of the skilled labor-intensive exports to the EU (which grew
by 175% from 1993 to 1998), over unskilled labor-intensive exports (which
grew by 73%), and the rapid growth of capital-intensive exports (which
grew by 166%; data calculated from UN COMTRADE database by Ka-
min´ski and Smarzyn´ska [2001, p. 273, table 2]). As the case studies will
illustrate, the biggest MNCs have led the increase in skilled labor-intensive
and capital-intensive exports (Kamin´ski and Smarzyn´ska 2001, p. 277).
Firms like Philips, Fiat Poland, and Thomson were the engines powering
these exports, and they will only gain prominence in the future.
Those sympathetic to the world-systems approach would highlight the
increase in imports made by foreign-owned firms and exporters. But what
is the overall developmental consequence of this dependence? And what
is the role of foreign-owned firms in this phenomenon? The world-systems
theorists make a lot out of the negative trade balance caused by imports.
And it is true that foreign-owned firms import significantly more than
domestic ones. However, there are several mitigating factors. First, all the
trade deficit is not entirely caused by the import of industrial goods, but
a lot by pent-up consumer demand. Second, this outflow is covered by
inward FDI. Foreign-owned firms have imported a lot of capital goods,
which they use both to satisfy domestic demand through import substi-
tution and to export (they imported $1.086 billion of capital goods in 1994,
which steadily increased to $3.274 billion in 1998 [Kamin´ski and Smar-
zyn´ska 2001, p. 276]). To the extent that firms assemble what used to be
imported, they are actually lowering the trade deficit. Third, over time,
they will purchase more and more of their inputs domestically, as they
become available. Indeed, they will be forced to purchase the cheapest
inputs of sufficient quality, regardless of where they are produced, or else
lose out on liberalized domestic and international markets. However, for-
eign-owned firms (most of which are multinationals) will have a greater
ability to export than domestically owned firms, everything else being
equal. This, of course, is the consequence of having well-established mar-
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keting networks and brand name recognition in the advanced markets
(both enormously expensive undertakings).
FIRM-LEVEL CASE STUDY DATA
While we believe that the public record of government intervention
strongly undermines the neoliberal interpretation of the Polish transition,
firm-level case study data will allow us to observe the hypothesized mech-
anisms at the microlevel, stengthening our finding and allowing us to
speak to the world-systems and organizational theories. We will present
five cases, each illustrating a pattern of firm transformation consistent
with our story of state-facilitated transition via controlled liberalization.
Our goal with the case studies is to examine the “natural life course”
of particular firms, to identify different strategies managers employ to
reconfigure their firms that collectively transform the postcommunist in-
dustrial system. Four firm trajectories are dominant among the medium
and large enterprises, producing, when aggregated, the base of the econ-
omy. These are: (1) the market-dependent SOE (36.36%); (2) late priva-
tization via FDI after state-led or supported restructuring in large SOEs
(18.18%); (3) domestic greenfields, leading to FDI (13.64%); and (4) FDI
of large SOEs prior to restructuring (9.09%). A fifth trajectory consists of
the small and medium-sized firms that were privatized via Poland’s quite
modest mass privatization scheme of 1995 and then listed on the stock
market (18.18%). The last trajectory is medium firms (4.54%) privatized
via a lease-to-buy arrangement by managers and employees. We will now
illustrate this typology with several case studies.
Market-Dependent SOEs
This textile firm (case 15), although still under state ownership in the
summer of 2001, was market dependent and was forced to implement
restructuring in order to survive. We can call this property form “state
capitalism,” because it is increasingly market dependent but is not pri-
vately owned.
In 1989, on the heels of the Tiananmen Square massacre, Polish firms
were no longer allowed to trade with China, costing this firm 60% of its
market. Shock therapy also created a crisis, as the company’s investment
subsidies and credits were cut, leaving it with huge unused productive
capacity, an unknown trademark, and many employees. Moreover, most
of the firm’s suppliers went bankrupt, leaving one domestic monopolist,
which raised prices.
The director of the textile firm, who had been deputy director for a
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long time prior to the transition, was forced to restructure and reorient
production in order to survive. This was made slightly easier, however,
by a loan provided by the division responsible for the light fabric at the
Ministry of Industry and Trade after the communist successor party co-
alition SLD/PSL came into power (anonymous interview, 2001). To the
neoliberals, this loan would be considered anathema, the continuation of
“soft-budget constraints” that would guarantee that a company would not
restructure.
With these funds, the firm was able to modernize all of its machines
with labor-saving technology purchased from the crisis-ridden Western
European textile sector. It reoriented to the local market, decreased em-
ployment from 1,600 to 1,100, and paid all of its taxes. It managed to
make constant investments in the production process to keep up with
trends in world prices. Indeed, the firm spent 3% to 5% of its $25 million
turnover on research and development, which, in addition to helping the
company make its own designs, was spent on figuring out how to incor-
porate foreign technology into its factory. The firm had become extremely
dependent on Western Europe—not for its market (it exported only 10%
of its output) but for its inputs (80% of which were imported in 2001).
This state-owned enterprise, then, far from blocking the transition to
capitalism (as Sachs and the neoliberals warned), helped make the Polish
transition possible. After restructuring was initiated with a loan from the
state, it supplied the state with revenue, even as it constantly upgraded
by incorporating Western technology and successfully competed on the
liberalized domestic market.
Late Privatization after Restructuring to FDI
This paper manufacturer (case 11) received state funds for restructuring
(which, along with reinvested turnover, totaled $150 million), prior to
privatization. In 1990, it exported 20% of its product to Western Europe;
by 1995, these exports had grown more than 50%. The company was
privatized only in 1997, by a German paper multinational, which invested
another $170 million, allowing further expansion into Western Europe.
This firm integrates the Polish economy with the Western European ones,
while simultaneously making it dependent on the decision of a firm with
operations in many countries, making investment decisions with its global
empire, not Poland’s development, in mind.
Small Domestic Greenfield Leading to FDI
In 1987 two engineers launched a small domestic start-up to service West-
ern consumer electronics in Warsaw (case 16). The firm grew and ex-
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panded to other cities. Later that year, the company started importing
Philips and other major brands of electronic appliances for retail.
Eventually, the company decided to build an assembly plant in Poland
to avoid tariffs, and it grew by contracting with a Philips subsidiary to
produce Philips television sets for the Polish market. A manager from a
state-owned company producing television sets was hired to build a new
factory, bringing many of his colleagues with him. The firm was situated
near Gdan´sk in order to take advantage of the large pool of unemployed
skilled and educated labor, the proximity to a major transport center, and,
consistent with our theory, the boosterism of the local city council which
provided tax breaks for investments and helped the firm negotiate with
the state bureaucracy.
The company expanded its contracts with other subsidiaries to produce
VCRs, TV tuners, and PC (printed circuit) boards. The Western partners
supplied the technology (typically, they “loaned” it to the company). By
1995, the company employed 800 people and was steadily growing. At
this point, Philips bought it out, having become interested in the strong
Polish market. Low labor costs induced the company to shift all its Eu-
ropean production to Poland. By 2001, it employed 2,000 people and
produced 3.3 million televisions sets, exporting 90% of its output (70%
to Western Europe), making it the number one producer, with 21%–22%
share of the European market. The firm also had 30% of the Polish market
and 10% of the market in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. In
addition, the company made 11 million tuners and 4.3 million PC boards
a year. It also attracted numerous suppliers, who set up factories imme-
diately adjacent to it that employed another 2,500 workers. While the
company produced many inputs locally, by value they were 60% to 70%
imported. The major component (the tubes) would soon be produced by
a Philips company in the Czech Republic.
This manufacturer of televisions in Poland started as a small greenfield
and literally grew into a joint venture and then became incorporated into
a multinational corporation that transferred technology and provided in-
vestment capital and access to coveted Western markets. The fact that
the Polish firm was incorporated into a firm with a long history of suc-
cessful capitalist accumulation brought significant advantages, even as it
made Poland dependent on the investment decisions of a Western Eu-
ropean multinational, on the level of Western European demand, and on
imported inputs. This type of development enhanced Poland’s ability to
catch up with Western Europe, but at the price of increasing Poland’s
vulnerability to an externally induced economic crisis.
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Other Paths and an Outlier: Patrimonial Restructuring in a Liberal
System
There are two other “paths of transition” of the medium and large en-
terprises observed in the case studies: (4) FDI prior to restructuring; and
(5) the small and medium-sized enterprises that were privatized under
Poland’s 1995 mass privatization program. Path 4 needs no explanation
except that the foreign owners without fail transferred technology and
exported to the EU. The mass privatization cases, however, deserve special
attention, for they represent the neoliberals’ preferred method of
privatization.
We believe that it is not a coincidence that these firms were the least
successful restructurers in the sample of firms. We will discuss a heavy-
engineering company privatized in 1995 under Poland’s mass privatiza-
tion program (case 2). Thirty-three percent of its shares were transferred
to fund no. 11 of the state-sanctioned investment funds. Twenty-two per-
cent went to other investment funds, 25% stayed with the state treasury,
4% went to employees, and the rest was sold to individual investors. As
with three of the four cases in the sample privatized in this way, the
investment fund was described as a disaster (and indeed a threat) by
management.16 The fund made no investments in the firm, and did not
even guarantee its credit so that it could obtain loans. As a result of this
mass privatization, as the director described it, “six or seven years were
lost to the firm” (anonymous interview, 2001). Management’s only hope
was to one day be acquired by a strategic investor.
According to the director, the firm was forced from the cash economy
after “Sachs’ draconian reforms” (anonymous interview, 2001). The coal
companies could not pay in cash, so they paid in coal. This in turn meant
that the firm had to pay its suppliers in coal. It was also forced to accept
nonpayments from its customers, as banks stopped providing credits to
finance purchases. The firm began to periodically arrange chains of debt
swaps. It initially paid employees in coal as well, but this practice ceased
when gas became the prevalent form of home heating. So this firm be-
haved like many in the former Soviet Union—engaging in various non-
monetary transactions and failing to restructure effectively.
Overall, the firm-level case studies support the account generated from
social structural theory: an embedded developmental state facilitated firm
restructuring (both SOEs and greenfields), but eventually foreign owners
(along with purchasers and suppliers) came to drive the pattern of
accumulation.
16 The only qualification to this evaluation was that the fourth firm found the invest-
ment fund useful because it gave its managers the idea of issuing a public offering of
its stock, which raised some investment capital.
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QUANTITATIVE DATA
In order to help us gain confidence in generalizing the findings from the
case studies to the Polish economy we turn to randomly sampled survey
data from a Polish oversample of 246 firms. This survey was carried out
by the World Bank and the EBRD in conjunction with Gallup in 1999
as part of a survey covering 4,000 companies in 25 postcommunist
countries.
We first divide ownership up into three exhaustive categories. These
are firms with any foreign ownership (FDI), firms with majority state
ownership, and domestic private firms. Forty firms had foreign investment
(16.26% of the sample), ranging from 3% to 100%. The mean was 59.91%,
and the standard deviation was 35.15%. The mode (11 firms) was 100%
foreign ownership. Forty-six firms had some state ownership; the mean
was 59.91%, the standard deviation 37.48%, and the mode 100% (19
firms). We code these as SOEs if the state has a controlling share (more
than 50%)—yielding 26 cases (10.57% of the total sample). The remainder
we code private domestic, constituting 73.17% of the sample or 180 cases.
Of the private domestic firms, we have information for the question
“Which of the following best describes the type of owner which now has
the largest stake in your firm, either directly or indirectly?” The options
are: individual, family, domestic company group, foreign company, bank,
investment fund, its managers, its workers, government or government
agency, other, don’t know/no answer, and collective farm.
As we can see from table 3, more than 77% of all firms identify indi-
viduals or a family as the type of largest owner. Moreover, the ownership
of firms was very concentrated. Among the private domestic firms, the
majority of shares was held by only one shareholder in almost 50% of
the cases, and by two or three shareholders in over 28% of the cases.
We find little evidence of the ownership patterns that characterize re-
combinant property. The large majority of firms are privately owned,
with a small number of shareholders, most of whom are identified as
individuals or families. Of those firms coded private domestic property,
only 12 firms had any state ownership. Thus, we see very clearly that we
have a set of formal property ownership that is typical of traditional
capitalist economies—various types of private domestic firms, mostly
owned by private persons or families, mixed with foreign-owned (and
part-foreign-owned) private firms, and a residual of state-owned enter-
prises (some of which have been partially privatized).
We use these data to help us identify the strengths and weaknesses of
the neoliberal, social structural, and world-systems theory with regard to
ownership and enterprise performance (see table 4). Organizational theory,
although rooted at the organizational level of analysis, is excluded because
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TABLE 3
Characteristics of Firms
Type of Ownership N (%)
Foreign investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 (16.25)
State-owned enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 (10.57)
Private domestic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 (73.28)
Type of largest owner of private domestic:
Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 (66.67)
Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 (11.11)
Domestic business group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 (8.89)
Investment fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 (2.22)
Managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 (1.67)
Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 (5.00)
State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 (1.11)
Don’t know/not applicable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 (0.56)
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 (100)
No. of owners that hold majority share of
private domestic:
One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 (49.44)
Two or three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (28.33)
More than three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 (22.22)
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 (100)
it does not seek to produce transcontextual generalizations about enter-
prise performance (Stark 1996, p. 112).
We have direct measures of subsidies and foreign competition. Subsidy
is measured by a question asking if the firm obtained a subsidy (including
toleration of tax arrears) from the federal or local government. ForComp
is measured by a four-point scale about perceived competition from foreign
companies as an ordinal ranking from “not at all important” to “slightly
important” to “fairly important” to “very important.”
We include a number of control variables. There are seven sector
dummy variables: manufaucturing, farming, trade, transport, services,
construction, and retail. We collapse one firm in mining and one listed as
“other” with farming. We also control for monopoly position (monopoly),
a measure of firm age in years since founding (age), and a dummy variable
size indicating the firm has 500 or more employees. Finally, a dummy
privatized indicates the firm was privatized.
For the dependent variables—or measures of “firm restructuring”—we
will use a variety of common indicators. Because the data set contains
mostly categorical data, we construct dummy variables for firm perfor-
mance, necessitating logistic regression. The most standard measure of
success is having a high rate of profit—the excess of revenue minus costs.
Profrt20 indicates the firm had a profit rate of 20% or above. Increasing
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TABLE 4
Odds Ratios (and SEs) for Indicators of Performance
Sales Exports Qualaccr Employ Invest High Profits
FDI vs. domestic
private . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.990*** 4.217** 4.858** 4.950*** 2.198† 3.44**
(1.350) (2.343) (3.1671) (2.378) (.962) (1.525)
SOE vs. domestic
private . . . . . . . . . . . . .419 1.890 2.154 .029** .638 .587
(.250) (1.357) (1.808) (.035) (.367) (.355)
Subsidy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.089 .716 2.064 .222* .952 .661
(.550) (.493) (1.867) (.154) (.473) (.336)
ForComp . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.102 1.494* 1.553† 1.259† 1.305* .790*
(.133) (.307) (.391) (.175) (.160) (.096)
Privatized . . . . . . . . . . . .716 .657 1.075 .069*** .772 .545
(.282) (.386) (.675) (.044) (.304) (.216)
Monopoly . . . . . . . . . . . DPS 2.420 DPF 2.994 DPS .217
Np3 (3.610) Np2 (.154) Np3 (.216)
Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.336 .770 7.326** .896 .710 .569
(.701) (.526) (5.062) (.687) (.364) (.303)
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .997 1.007 .995 .986 .996 .992
(.008) (.011) (.013) (.010) (.008) (.008)
Manufacturing . . . . . . .538 7.187† 6.784* .722 .247* 4.040*
(.330) (8.106) (6.661) (.476) (.175) (2.390)
Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .301 3.110 1.361 .6316 .195* 2.335
(.212) (3.891) (1.631) (.4920) (.153) (1.581)
Retail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .269* DPF .416 .285* .129** 1.786
(.166) Np49 (.570) (.182) (.093) (1.031)
Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .996 .459 DPF 1.382 .331 4.109*
(.726) (.690) Np26 (1.011) (.262) (2.858)
Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .633 1.829 1.346 .922 .239* 1.346
(.403) (2.187) (.797) (.589) (.175) (.797)
Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . .292 3.0744 1.091 .342 .242† 1.091
(.215) (3.816) (.776) (.281) (.199) (.7761)
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 188 237 237 234 237
Note.—DPFpdropped, predicts failure perfectly; DPSpdropped, predicts success perfectly.
† P ! .1.
* P ! .05.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.
exports, by our definition, is an indicator of restructuring. This strongly
implies that the firm was able to gain market share in the supercompetitive
world market. Exports indicates the firm increased its exports over the
last three years. Similarly, the variable qualaccr indicates the firm received
an international certificate of quality accreditation (an ISO 9000 rating),
indicating industrial upgrading to the level of the world market. Increas-
ing sales is another commonly used indicator of firm performance in
transition economies, as it implies a successful adaptation to market in-
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tegration. Sales indicates the firm increased sales over the last three years.
Hiring new employees also indicates restructuring—as new organizational
activities require employees with additional skills. Employ indicates a firm
has increased the number of employees over the last three years. Finally,
invest indicates the firm made new investments in the last three years—
which clearly indicates some restructuring activity (for the use of these
indicators in econometric models see the literature review in King [2000]).
How these indicators of performance line up for the neoliberal and
social structural theories is straightforward. The predictions derived from
the world-systems approach, however, require some discussion. In this
perspective, foreign-owned firms seek ownership primarily to capture do-
mestic market share, very possibly by selling finished products produced
outside of the country, or assembling foreign parts for domestic con-
sumption. In both cases, the need for investment will be minimal. The
same goes for hiring new employees, obtaining ISO 9000 quality certifi-
cates, and increasing exports and sales. World-systems theorists might
predict different effects of profitability depending on the circumstances.
Some world-systems theorists would not be surprised at high rates of
profit, since a major mechanism of the theory is the transfer of surplus
out of the country through the repatriation of profits, and foreign firms
might be enticed into a postcommunist country with promises of tax
holidays, which should boost profitability through transfer pricing into
the postcommunist country. Of course, with time, tax holidays expire, and
(outward) transfer pricing to avoid taxation will gain prominence. World-
systems theorists tend to assume transfer pricing to be the main mecha-
nism of surplus appropriation and thus predict that foreign ownership
should result in low profitability. We assume the latter for the purposes
of this article (although of course the sign of the coefficient will allow the
evaluation of both predictions).
The full regression equation is
Yp a ß(FDI) ß(SOE) ß(Privatization)
( ) ( ) ( )ß ForComp ß Subsidy ß Monopoly
( ) ( ) ( )ß Age ß Size ß Manufacturing
( ) ( ) ( )ß Farming ß Trade ß Transport
( ) ( )ß Services ß Retail .
Private domestic is the excluded ownership category, and construction is
the excluded sector category.
Table 4 summarizes the results from the regression equation. On only
one of the six indicators of restructuring do domestic private firms out-
perform SOEs. All things held equal, SOEs are 97% less likely than
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domestic private firms to have hired new employees over the last three
years. This perhaps is a legacy of the discriminatory tax on excess wages
for SOEs that was in place until 1995. Quite possibly SOEs developed
routines to rely on retraining their existing employees as opposed to hiring
outside labor. At any rate, the other five indicators of firm performance
are not close to being statistically significant, and SOEs are actually more
likely than private domestic firms to increase exports and gain interna-
tional quality accreditation. Thus, the pattern across all the indicators is
more consistent with hypothesis 2 than with hypothesis 1.
Similarly, on five of the six indicators, hypothesis 4 is supported over
hypothsis 3. The one indicator of performance that is negatively associated
with subsidies is hiring new employees. This may only indicate that sub-
sidies flow to firms in a response to job loss.
Similarly, the pattern strongly supports hypothesis 5 (firms with FDI
will outperform domestic private firms) over hypothesis 6 (domestic pri-
vate firms will outperform firms with FDI). Everything being held equal,
firms with foreign investment compared to domestic private firms are
199% more likely to have increased sales in the past three years, 322%
more likely to have increased exports over the last three years, 386% more
likely to have received an ISO 9000 accreditation in the past three years,
395% more likely to have hired new employees in the last three years,
244% more likely to have a profit rate of 20% or more, and 120% more
likely to have made investments in the past three years (although this is
only marginally statistically significant [Pp.072]).
Finally, hypothesis 7 is supported over hypothesis 8—firms with greater
levels of foreign competition restructure more than firms with lower levels
of foreign competition in four cases (although two have only marginal
levels of significance)—with the exception of the profitability indicator.
For each level of perceived competition (on a four-point scale), firms are
49% more likely to increase exports, 53% more likely to obtain quality
accreditation, almost 26% more likely to increase employment, and more
than 30% more likely to increase investments. Firms were, however, 21%
less likely to have high rates of profit. This overall pattern is consistent
with restructuring under the pressure of competition (thereby inducing
innovation as well as lower profits).
Overall, this statistical analysis corroborates the comparative and case
study evidence. Poland’s economy is predominantly private, but SOEs
restructure and become marketized prior to eventual privatization. The
dynamism of the economy comes from foreign investment as Poland’s
economy reindustrializes on the basis of exports to Western markets and
the technological transfer of MNCs and other core-based purchasers.
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A MODEL OF POLISH CAPITALISM
What type of capitalist system has emerged in Poland? First, there was
not much evidence of postcommunist involution among the case studies
or the random sample of firms—almost all firms made investments into
the production process. There were, however, recourses to patrimonial
integrating mechanisms—but this occurred especially in mass privatized
firms, as well as firms unable to integrate into the global economy.
Similarly, there was no clear evidence of any recombinant property in
the 22 case studies. In 15 cases there was some interenterprise ownership,
and/or partial state ownership—and thus potentially recombinant prop-
erty. Of course, these do not necessarily indicate recombinant property as
Stark describes it, since these formal ownership patterns are consistent
with a wide range of actual ownership relations in systems with extensive
corporate ownership, including all forms of vertical and horizontal in-
tegration. What Stark means by recombinant property is dense cross-
ownership ties tracing and facilitating interfirm cooperation, with partial
state ownership allowing for an appeal to the state as an alternative
“legitimating principle,” resulting in recurrent state bailouts (Stark 1996,
p. 993). This type of ownership was present in none of the 15 firms in
which some amount (no matter how small) of interfirm ownership and/
or some amount of direct or indirect state ownership continued to exist.
These ownership patterns resulted from one of four different situations:
(1) small residual ownership shares (conferring no control) left over from
socialist-era reforms, (2) as a means to break up giant socialist conglom-
erates to induce strategic foreign investment, (3) as a scheme to minimize
taxes, and (4) as horizontal integration.17 The latter two mechanisms are
typical of all corporate economies, and the first two are only temporary
deviations from the emergence of foreign ownership. Overall, there were
only trivial amounts of cross-ownership among these firms, and all in-
terviewees described a clear separation of the state and the private econ-
omy (i.e., there was no interference by or involvement of state officials),
and unambiguous market integration.
The private sector, including a substantial amount of FDI, has con-
stantly grown at the expense of the state sector. The private sector’s share
of the GDP grew slowly but steadily, from 45% in 1992 to 70% in 2000
(EBRD 2001, p. 180). The evidence does not seem to indicate the existence
of some version of a unique postcommunist capitalism based on recom-
binant property. Rather, what has emerged in Poland would be quite
familiar to neoliberals: market-dependent firms with clear boundaries,
employing free wage labor, competing with other firms (both foreign and
17 A longer version of this article available from the authors elaborates on these four
situations, but see app. table A1 for a summary.
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domestic). Of course, there are SOEs around in large numbers, but this
is far from unusual in Western European economies. Moreover, all of the
directors of the firms in the case studies under state ownership expressed
the hope that they would find a strategic foreign investor to privatize
them. Similarly, business groups have emerged, but these too are present
in most capitalist countries. We can expect domestic business groups and
MNCs to continue to privatize the remaining SOEs, while the less prom-
ising will eventually be rehabilitated by the state or allowed to go
bankrupt.
In Weberian terms, the economy is indeed an example of “modern
rational capitalism” (Weber 1978). The state is a fairly well-functioning
bureaucracy with relatively high capacity, there are free and fair elections
and a free press, and private actors dominate the economy. Most impor-
tant, there is a relative separation of the political system and the economy.
That is, it is possible to be a capitalist without also being seriously involved
in the political system.
At the same time, the Polish state pursued a variety of industrial policy
tools to aid enterprise restructuring. Our primary research and other pub-
lished accounts do not point to widespread rent seeking as predicted by
neoliberal theory. Rather, the presence of domestic and foreign competition
seems to have disciplined the firms, forcing them to channel state subsidies
into market-oriented technological investment. Thus, a good deal of Polish
industrial policy seems to have taken the form of what Schrank and Kurtz
(2005) refer to as open economy industrial policies; policies that provide
subsidies for export, rather than old-style industrial policy that provided
protection of infant industries and import substitution.
The Polish system, however, is not identical to the capitalism found at
the core of Western Europe, because it is significantly poorer (and thus
a “late industrializer”), and extraordinarily dependent on FDI and trade.
While some of the smaller European economies are probably similarly
dependent, it seems possible that Poland may have a greater reliance on
MNCs for technology transfer (a consequence of the outdated capital stock
resulting from prior shielding from Western competition, and a failure to
phase out old technology in communist Poland’s “shortage economy”). It
also seems that even more of the “commanding heights” of the Central
Eastern European economies—banking, telecom, utilities, and high-tech
manufacturing—are foreign owned. For example, 77.5% of Polish banking
stocks are held by foreigners, compared with 4% in Germany, 3% in Italy,
10% in Spain, and 13% in Austria (Staniszkis 2001, p. 5). Polish growth
has become extremely dependent on imported industrial goods, foreign
markets, and the investment decisions of foreign-owned firms and banks.
It is therefore extremely sensitive to exchange-rate fluctuations and
changes in external demand.
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CONCLUSION
This review of postcommunist Poland’s economic history, although only
a partial sketch, should substantially weaken the notion that Poland’s
relative success has anything to do with the superiority of neoliberal tran-
sition theory and practice. Neoliberal theory cannot easily explain the fact
that the Polish state took an active role in leading the transition from
“the plan” to “the market.” The Polish state was strongly procapitalist,
and it succeeded in creating an economy relatively separate from the state.
However, the state actually grew in size and was clearly developmen-
talist.18 State action was the initial foundation of Poland’s successful tran-
sition, as it enabled and induced domestic firms (SOEs and private) to
restructure to be competive on world markets. It also facilitated eventual
MNC entry, which brought investment and, crucially, technology transfer
and marketing networks in the EU, both contributing to manufacturing
exports. The integration into global commodity chains of skilled-labor
and capital-intensive manufactured goods prevented the Polish manu-
facturing sector from falling back into nonmarket methods of integration,
thereby preventing the involution of the state and economy as witnessed
in much of the postcommunist world.
Not only were the neoliberals wrong about economics; their political
predictions have not come to pass. Delaying large-scale privatization did
not lead to a politically powerful constituency that blocked or reversed
the transition from a planned economy to a market capitalist society.
Rather, Poland’s relative success came despite a lack of political insulation
for reform technocrats, a necessity according to neoliberal economists. As
Ekiert and Kubik (1998, p. 547) noted: “In Poland mass protest actions
were more common than in any other postcommunist country and con-
tributed to both political instability and a relatively high level of ac-
countability for reform measures and policy decisions implemented by
the ruling elites.”
The neoliberal rebuttal to these assessments would likely be to invoke
the “orthodox paradox.” Such a defense would point out that these (non-
neoliberal) measures were temporary, and therefore simply a manifestation
of the “orthodox paradox” (first identified by Kahler [1990, p. 55])—that
a strong state is necessary to usher in a liberal economy. This defense
conflates a “strong state” with a “developmentalist state.” The solution to
the “orthodox paradox” (as articulated by Kahler, or any neoliberal econ-
omist that we know of) was not to advocate Keynesian and microinter-
ventionist policies (including sectoral industrial policy), and certainly not
to slow down the privatization of large enterprises to allow them time to
18 According to Ekiert (2001), employment in Poland’s public administration more than
doubled, from 69,319 in 1989 to 171,246 in 1998.
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restructure.19 The identification of a paradox simply excludes the phe-
nomenon from being covered by neoliberal theory (in this crucial case in
the extremely important “transition” period), a clear example of what
Lakatos referred to as a “degenerating” research tradition.20
While the neoliberals were incorrect about the means through which
the comparatively successful Polish transition occurred, the case-study
data suggests they were more on target about the end point than a pre-
diction derived from the organizational analysis of Stark, who theorized
a “distinctive variant” of capitalism emerging in Eastern Europe based
on firms with “recombinant property.” The same conditions that lead to
recombinant property in Hungary and the Czech Republic should also
exist in their Central European neighbor, Poland. And yet the Polish
economy, 10 years after the transition, was dominated by private property
that was market integrated. There was insignificant blurring of public
and private property, as the theory of recombinant property specifies.
Rather, an organizationally distinct state (concretely consisting of the Min-
istry of Industry and Trade, the AID, and state-owned banks, among
other state organizations) greatly influenced the activity of firms through
regulation and subsidies, and at times through equity ownership, just as
in the advanced capitalist core. Of course, these data do not refute the
theory of recombinant property, which never claimed to predict property
change in Poland, but it does seem to require some additional belt of
theory to explain why Poland is different from its Central European
neighbors.
World-systems theory also requires additional theoretical fortification
to account for the Polish case. To say, as Burawoy does, that differences
between Russia and Central Eastern Europe are as much caused by the
“insertion into the world system” as “their communist origins” seems dif-
ficult to defend. The “agents of globalization,” the World Bank and the
19 Kahler himself is not a neoliberal, but rather critiques both the neoliberal and het-
erodox economists.
20 Neoliberals familiar with Poland’s economy could point to the fact that Poland
experienced declining GDP rates starting in 1998 (while it averaged 6.6% from 1995–
97), dipping from 4.0% in 2000 to 2.0% by 2001, before bottoming out at 1.4% in
2002, and rebounding to 3.6% in 2003 and an estimated 5.5% in 2004. Could it be
that this slowdown was caused by excessive “statism”? We think it is more likely that
this slowdown is a consequence of the normal functioning of liberal dependent capi-
talism in several ways. First, it corresponds to the slowdown in Germany and the EU,
and the dependent developer is very much dependent on demand in the core of the
capitalist economy—in this case, Germany. Second, the slowdown corresponds to a
tight contraction of broad money (monetary emissions and bank loans), as indicated
in table 1. Part of this reflects the victory of AWS/UW over the SLD/PSL alliance in
1997 and the concomitant macroeconomic policy. In part, tight money keeps the cur-
rency strong, which makes it easier for Poland to service its foreign trade deficit. At
any rate, Poland’s growth seems to be accelerating again.
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IMF, along with MNCs, would logically have had much greater leverage
over the much smaller states of Central Eastern Europe than they had
over Russia. How then is Russia “inserted” into a disadvantaged place
relative to the Central European cases?
Moreover, it hardly seems that the “system logic” of global capitalism
is wiping out the differences between Central Europe and the rest of the
postcommunist world. If anything, the differences are growing, as the
countries of Central Europe maintain liberal polities with relatively ef-
fective states, have economies dominated by manufacturing exports, and
welcome foreign ownership of the commanding heights of the economy.
In contrast, Russia has turned into a semiauthoritarian regime with a
very weak, if bloated, state administration. The commanding heights of
the economy are owned by politically connected capitalists, and the econ-
omy is dominated by raw-materials exports while much of the high-tech
manufacturing sector has been wiped out. While capitalism might be
converging within Central Eastern Europe, it is increasingly diverse
throughout the postcommunist world.
A reformulation of world-systems theory to fit the Polish case would
have to substantially transform its core logic. Such theorists would have
to claim that the world system keeps (or sends) countries to the periphery
by excluding them from flows of international capital and exchange. How-
ever, this can also be interpreted as a degeneration in the subresearch
tradition—as it reverses one of its central “hardcore postulates”—that
multinationals and involvement in the world system are the mechanisms
that serve to usher in underdevelopment.
Of course, as world-systems theorists would rightly point out, the tran-
sition success was beyond easy control of any class, class alliance, class
segment, or state agency. External events and forces are crucial in coun-
tries much larger than Poland. Still, states can pursue better and worse
policies to foster growth.
Most generally, this article extends to the postcommunist world the
findings of those who emphasize the importance of a bureaucratic state
with high capacity (Evans and Rauch 1999) which pursues developmental
policies (Evans 1995; Wade 1990) for successful integration into the global
capitalist system.
Neoliberals can rebut this statist argument by pointing out that while
there might be some successful cases of industrial policy, there are many,
many examples of industrial policy that have degenerated into nothing
more than inefficient rent seeking. This raises the crucial question: Why
are some developmental states successful, while many others seem to only
waste resources by coddling inefficient crony capitalists? Chibber (2002)
provides one answer to this question, claiming that the difference between
unsuccessful state intervention in India and successful state intervention
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in Korea is not that the latter had a strong bureaucracy while the former
had a weak one. Rather, it was the presence of a “nodal agency” in Korea
that oversaw the entire planning apparatus, and the lack of such an agency
(with sufficient power to enforce its will) in India.
In Poland there was no such supra-agency coordinating the many dif-
ferent industrial policies. Instead, our analysis of Poland suggests that
state resources were not wasted by enterprises because firms had reason
to believe that these subsidies would not be extended indefinitely. Meeting
the criteria for entry into the EU was a looming reality, meaning that the
state faced serious pressure to reduce subsidies and completely liberalize
most markets in the near future. Unlike old-style, import substitution
industrialization (ISI) policies, the policies employed by the Polish gov-
ernment mostly sought to foster survival on liberalized domestic markets
and winning foreign market share, rather than to protect the local one
from foreign penetration. These policies were aimed at softening the shock
of restrictive monetary policies, giving firms breathing space to gradually
restructure as they prepared for sale to foreign investors. The extensive
use of tax breaks for investments and exports is much more difficult to
appropriate as rents than direct subsidies. This type of “open economy”
industrial policy seems to be far more resistant to capture than old ISI
versions (Schrank and Kurtz 2005).
In addition, this article contributes to a “progressive problem shift” in
the neoclassical sociological subresearch tradition by bringing the role of
foreign direct investment into the center of the analysis. This is not a
concession to neoliberals, who have no theoretical reason to favor FDI
over domestic capital. It is drawn from the “core postulates” of neoclassical
sociology; the history of capital accumulation is crucial to global
development.
We must emphasize that the evidence in this article indicates that a
successful transition is not just the function of an embedded develop-
mental state pursuing industrial policies, but also of large amounts of
FDI. Industrial policy facilitated enterprise restructuring, while acceler-
ating levels of FDI brought technological upgrading and global market
share in skilled and capital-intensive manufacturing sectors.
This leads to the question: Why was Poland able to pursue this path?
We believe that the ultimate cause can be found in the pattern of conflict
and collaboration in the postcommunist power elite. In Poland and the
rest of Central Eastern Europe the technocracy and intellectuals blocked
the nomenklatura’s bid to transform itself into a grand bourgeoisie, steer-
ing state property into the hands of foreign capitalists (Eyal et al. 1998,
2001; King 2002; King and Szele´nyi 2005). This fact, our analysis suggests,
explains a substantial amount of the divergence in postcommunist
capitalism.
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